Introduction
How to evaluate the U.S. military administration is one of the most controversial themes in modern Korean history. The narrower topic of how to evaluate the health and medical services under the U.S. military administration also provides contentious issues. There have been several attempts to investigate the healthcare under the U.S. military administration as a movement of criticism and self-reflection on the fact that research on modern medical history in Korea thus far has been excessively focused on the opening port era and the Japanese colonial period. Evaluation of the healthcare services under the U.S. military administration is largely divided into two opposing opinions.
One school looks at the military administration's medical system rather negatively, arguing that the medical system centered on public healthcare during the Japanese colonial period was transformed to the American private healthcare system during this period under the U.S. military administration (Shin, 2000: 231) . On the other hand, there are several positive viewpoints arguing that the health and medical system, which was controlled and functioned within a frame of police works during the Japanese colonial period, could eventually settle as an independent field during the U.S. military administration (Kim, 2011: 34) . They regard the period as the one in which the public health system was able to be established based on a new concept. Despite such contradicting evaluations, they agree that the framework of the current Korean healthcare system was fundamentally built during the U.S. military administration.
The several studies that have been done on the medical system under the U.S. military administration thus far have mostly focused on the health and medical system and relevant policies along with leading figures during that period (Shin & Seo, 2013: 196-206) . Regulations and policies deserve research priority in that they provide the most fundamental framework for a certain field's activities. However, the fact that a certain rule existed and whether it actually functioned well are two completely different matters. It is difficult to evaluate the actual situation only depending on the existence of a certain rule. Hence, it is necessary to show how a given problem YEO In-sok : U.S. Military Administration's Malaria Control Activities (1945 Activities ( -1948 제24권 제1호(통권 제49호) 35-65, 2015년 4월 │37 was actually solved by the existing regulation and organization or how they failed to do so, in order to clearly understand the actual situation surrounding the U.S. military administration's health and medical services.
Accumulating the cases on the success and failure of such problem solving will enable us to decide whether the regulation and organization actually functioned effectively. So far, very little has been done concerning the control of a specific health problem under the U.S. military administration, and this is indeed what this paper attempts to address. This paper attempts to investigate the anti-malaria activities initiated by the U.S. military.
Here, a question might emerge regarding why malaria was chosen among a number of infectious diseases in this paper. One of the answers to this question is that it was the most widely spread disease at the time and hence the most problematic disease for army forces in battlefields. In fact, the greatest threat to the U.S. military in Japan and the Pacific region during the World War II was not the Japanese army but malaria. Hence, the U.S. military labored to prevent and control malaria throughout the war and, as a result, it accumulated a substantial amount of experience and knowledge on it. These experiences were extremely helpful in controlling malaria in the U.S. military's occupied territories such as Japan and Korea after the end of the war. Hence, the malaria case provides examples where the experience and knowledge accumulated during the war helped to solve subsequent health problems in the occupied territories.
Moreover, the usage of DDT is to be discussed here. DDT, which is one of the most problematic materials developed by human beings, began to spread broadly at the end of World War II. DDT used as a pesticide was effective not only in killing mosquitos that carry malaria, but also in killing a vector of another problematic disease, typhus. As such, the usage of DDT dramatically changed the control of malaria. Hence, anti-malaria activities during the military administration will provide some cases that reveal how DDT was actually used.
Station of the U.S. Military and Establishment of Public Health System
The U.S. military stationed in South Korea after the end of the Second World War ran the military administration before the establishment of independent government in Korea. Due to the characteristics of the military administration, the maintenance of public order was given first priority, while the field of health and medical services received relatively little attention. However, the spread of various infectious diseases can cause social unrest and the diseases' prevalence in the field can also become contagious to the occupation forces of the U.S. military. Hence, it was necessary to build a health and medical services system that focuses on prevention of infectious diseases. For this purpose, knowing the current situation of the health and medical services in South Korea was a prior task.
The U.S. military, which was completely ignorant about the South Korean situation at the beginning of the stationing, first had to obtain information about the situation from local people. In addition to the simple collection of information, the help and participation from the locals were essential in future ruling. The term "locals" here not only refers to Koreans, but also includes Japanese who have been ruling Korea for the past 35 years. From a viewpoint of the U.S. military, who had to launch a new government by taking over the sovereign of South Korea, assistance from the Japanese who have been ruling the peninsula was critical, rather than support from YEO In-sok : U.S. Military Administration's Malaria Control Activities (1945 Activities ( -1948 제24권 제1호(통권 제49호) 35-65, 2015년 4월 │39 the Koreans who were being governed. In fact, the U.S. military initially attempted to make use of Japanese government officials in the military administration by leaving the organization of the Japanese Government General of Korea, but eventually gave up the plan due to Koreans' fierce resistance. In the field of health and medical services, the military government wished that the experienced Japanese doctors, scientists and laboratory operators would stay longer to train the Korean workforce for future services. However, the Korean sentiment could not allow it.
1) The U.S. military, who could no longer let the experienced Japanese government officials participate in the military administration, had to be satisfied with the Korean aid. The representative figure in the health and medical services sector that became a Korean partner to the U.S. military was Lee Yong-sul. Lee Yong-sul was the committee chairman of the Kon Kuk Medical Association founded right after the liberation, whose numberone task was to take over the organization of Japanese doctors and their hospitals. The committee also took care of the homecoming war victims from overseas. The military government who recognized such activities of the Kon Kuk Medical Association asked the association to nominate a candidate for sanitation advisor, and Lee who was the committee chairman at the time being was recommended. He acted as an advisor at the beginning and was named as a chief of the Bureau of Health (Roh, 1998: 366) . Both were the experts of preventing infectious diseases and they played active roles during the military administration and after the establishment of the Korean government. However, they had little opportunity to participate in the public health of the Japanese 4) This was a movement that fundamentally changed the previous philosophy and framework of sanitary administration, by separating sanitation work that used to be a part of the police work during the colonial era and founding an independent organization in charge of it.
5)
This moved the responsibility for public health and quarantines from the police to the field of medicine. As a result, medical doctors were appointed to be in charge of the public health organization.
Meanwhile, during this transition, there was resistance from government officials who were steeped in old-school thought that public health and In a context of the active usage of doctors, the reporting system of infectious disease outbreak also saw a huge change. During the colonial era, sanitary activities were done within a framework of public order and hence the main agent of the report was the general police instead of doctors. As such, policemen without professional knowledge on diseases confirmed and reported diseases, which inevitably reduced the medical accuracy of the reported diseases. The reason that the U.S. military could not rely on the disease statistics recorded during the colonial era was thus not only the high omission rate, but also because the checking and reporting of the infectious diseases were done by non-experts. Hence, the military government assigned an authority to confirm and report the diseases only to the doctors. It also made use of telephones to make the reporting more prompt. As was suspected, various infectious diseases began to break out after There was no device or medicine that could be conveniently and effectively used for mosquito extermination.
16) However, the U.S. military, who had bitter experiences from malaria, paid a great amount of attention on the prevention and management of malaria afterward. As a result, the U.S.
military could accumulate substantial knowledge on malaria and could be equipped with an experienced professional workforce and organization that could properly control it by the end of the Pacific War. organizations that could effectively manage malaria, which differed from the early stage of the war. Moreover, by the end of the war, DDT, which was the strongest pesticide ever, was invented to be used for mosquito control, making malaria management easier. The result of these experiences can be seen in the prompt writing and publishing of the booklet for the control of insect-borne diseases including malaria in parallel with the U.S. military's stationing in Japan, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Hence, the U.S. military who began to be stationed in Japan and Korea right after the end of the war could more effectively respond to malaria or other insect-borne diseases than any other infectious diseases. were summarized in the previously mentioned report. According to this report, there were a total of 23 mosquito species inhabiting Korea including "Anopheles sinensis," which is a representative mosquito that carries malaria. All except for three were commonly observed in Japan.
Research on the Malaria situation in South Korea

21)
Conducting surveys on the vector insects, mosquitos, was the most fundamental task for understanding the malaria situation in South Korea.
Actually, understanding how many malaria patients exist at the moment or how many there were in the past was important as well. In order to complement the previously incomplete statistics, consultations with experts were also underway. The military government listened to the report on the overall malaria situation and characteristics in Korea from
Kobayashi Harujiro who was a professor at Keijo Imperial University and a renowned parasitologist. His explanation is summarized next. In Korea, malaria was especially prevalent in southern areas, and there were few fatal cases, as the symptoms were not so severe. Moreover, vector insects were mainly "Anopheles hyrcanus sinensis," which usually propagated in rice paddies or puddled. It was not easy to conduct a nationwide survey that confirms infection through direct blood smear and hence there are no accurate statistics regarding this. Nevertheless, the authorities presumed that approximately 20% of the residents in southern rural areas were infected with malaria and that approximately one million patients experienced an outbreak nationwide each year (Chu, 1951: 92) . Statistical data partially exist in Jeollabuk-do, Chungcheongnam-do, and Gyeongsangbuk-do, and Gyeongsangbuk-do had a significantly higher incidence compared to other regions. Because of this, Gyeongsangbuk-do was under special management when the malaria eradication project supported by the WHO began in the late 1950s. (Chu, 1951: 92) YEO In-sok : U.S. Military Administration's Malaria Control Activities (1945 Activities ( -1948 │ 醫史學
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As shown above, the military government seems to have had substantial interest in malaria control and attempted management from the early stationing in South Korea. This can be quite surprising considering the fact that the malaria that broke out in South Korea was not as fatal as the outbreak that the U.S. military experienced in the South Sea Islands. It was much milder. The reason malaria was not designated as a legal infectious disease during the colonial era despite large number of malaria outbreaks is surmised to be the mild nature of Korean malaria. Nevertheless, even though Korean malaria was not as fatal as other infectious diseases, malaria was the most common disease for the U.S. military stationed in Korea.
Actually, in terms of the nationwide prevalence of other infectious diseases such as cholera and typhus, there were few cases in the U.S. military.
On the contrary, there was an endless stream of malaria patients within the troops throughout the summer even though a series of actions were taken, including DDT spray and mosquito repellent incense (Chu, 1952: 3).
Moreover, although tertian malaria is not fatal, it substantially diminishes infected individuals' activity. In case of high malaria infection rate, the overall activity level of the group will dwindle, and hence the disease should never be overlooked. In that sense, malaria was a particularly important disease from an economic point of view. In Korea, which was an agricultural nation at the time, malaria patient outbreaks were focused on the busy season for farmers, i.e., from June to August. The labor loss due to malaria was serious, and it reduced agricultural productivity. Hence, malaria was a significant disease not only from the viewpoint of civilians' public health, but also from an economic perspective (Choi, 1949: 37) . 
DDT and Malaria Control
Malaria control is conducted in two ways. The first is by administering medicine to infected individuals, and the second is by controlling vector insects, i.e., mosquitos. Even though controlling mosquitos is the more fundamental measure, it is nearly impossible to thoroughly prevent mosquito outbreaks due to mosquitos' broad range of origin locales.
Hence, it has been common to focus on medicinal administrations. Actually, malaria management during the colonial era was also confined to quinine administrations to patients. The necessity for mosquito control was surely broached at the time, but mosquito control remained a mere principle due to its practical difficulty (Yeo, 2011: 72) .
The development of DDT as a pesticide fundamentally changed the pessimism on mosquito control. Although DDT was initially synthesized in 1874, its effectiveness as a pesticide was found no sooner than 1939. DDT came into the spotlight as its effects on controlling mosquitos that carry malaria, which was most problematic during the Second World War, and on others lice that carry typhus fever were confirmed (Kinkela, 2011: 20) .
DDT possesses strong insecticidal effects and long residual effects while having been believed harmless to the human body or environment, all of which made DDT a miracle pesticide.
The spray of DDT can be largely divided into two ways. The first is to dust powder, which is usually used for the control of lice and fleas that carry typhus fever. Although the National Chemical Laboratory in Seoul succeeded in manufacturing DDT by February 1946, 36) most of the DDT used in Korea depended on imports. 37) Japan also used to import the final product of DDT to begin with. Since DDT has an active component of 10%, Japan imported condensed DDT and used it after mixing it with 90% talc. In May of 1946, DDT production was approved in Japan, and independent DDT production became possible in Japan (Sams, 1998: 85 The problem was not confined to DDT spray. Mosquito control was more effectively done through collaboration with the engineering battalion. 39) As stagnant water is a common place for mosquito propagation, it was possible to get rid of such mosquito propagation spots by making gutters to drain the water or filling puddles themselves. However, it was hard to expect this kind of direct action from the engineering battalion in Korea. Although a shortage of hands was the primary reason, a more serious problem was that randomly draining water from or filling in rice paddies regarded as the mosquito propagation origin was nearly impossible in Korea.
In fact, although the U.S. military suffered as a result of the malaria outbreak in the early phase of the Pacific War, it became able to systematically respond to malaria as experience and knowledge accumulated along with DDT development. This fact is clearly reflected in the manual published by MacArthur Headquarters right after the end of the war for controlling insect-borne diseases including malaria, as previously mentioned. However, when closely looking at the contents of the manual, there are several parts that are not applicable to the South Korean situation, as the manual was written based on experiences on the battlefields in the South Sea islands. For example, extensive DDT spray using airplanes was possible and engineering battalions could fill in the puddles of mosquito outbreaks using heavy machinery in the islands. However, it was not easy to directly apply such methods to South Korea. Hence, the anti-malaria activities through mosquito control were inevitably limited to some extent.
Conclusion
The anti-malaria activities led by the U.S. military government come to an end with the termination of military administration. Then, can we judge the anti-malaria activities during the military administration to be successful? It is hard to give a definite answer. Most of all, the decision on whether something is a success or a failure, differs depending on the criteria for success. Nevertheless, an indirect answer can be made by showing the changes from the previous period, i.e., the colonial period.
First of all, the greatest change was the direct extermination activity on malaria's vector insect, i.e., the mosquito. As mentioned before, this was thanks to the development of the strong pesticide DDT. The malaria control during the colonial era relied on posterior measures such as quinine doses for prevention or treatment, rather than vector insect control, which can fundamentally prevent a disease outbreak. However, following the emergence of DDT, a transition toward a more fundamental direction of vector insect control became possible. One thing to point out is that DDT's potential damage to the human body or the environment was not seriously considered since there was little recognition of the side effects of DDT at the time. Moreover, the establishment of a more prompt and accurate report system about outbreak patients and of reliable disease statistics were improved compared to the past. Meanwhile, these improvements were not YEO In-sok : U.S. Military Administration's Malaria Control Activities (1945 Activities ( -1948 제24권 제1호(통권 제49호) 35-65, 2015년 4월 │61 just confined to malaria, but involved the overall disease report systems.
Of course, there were several limitations. For example, as the activity was mainly focused on cities and regions where the U.S. Army resided, regions with more severe malaria sometimes received little prevention support.
Anti-malaria activities were conducted during the Korean War, and a nationwide malaria eradication project followed, which was supported by the WHO in the late 1950s. In particular, the malaria eradication project was the first large-scale project supported by the WHO, and it proves the fact that malaria was given first priority in public health at the time. Hence, the military administration's anti-malaria activities are significant, in that they provided a starting point for anti-malaria projects conducted afterwards.
